We must always have an idea before we can ask a meaningful question. For any question consists of ideas, and therefore the question cannot be posed before we have acquired the ideas out of which it is composed. For example, before I could formulate the question that I'm answering, I had to have the concept of a question, an idea and the notion of coming first.
Perhaps a more fundamental philosophical question is where do our ideas come from? Plato's famous Theory of the Forms is one attempt to answer this. He argued that we were acquainted with Forms, such as justice itself, beauty, and the good, prior to birth. The ontological status that Plato ascribed to the Forms is hotly disputed, but it is evident from his theory of recollection that the Forms are postulated as the source of the ideas that we have in this life.
Sunday, November 27, 2011
Monday, November 21, 2011
What If Everyone Were on Prozac?
Does pure pleasure have inherent value? Here are a couple of scenarios to consider: 1) We develop the ability to put an electrode into one's pleasure center, and indefinitely support them with IV drip, etc., while they do nothing, think nothing, and feel nothing but intense pleasure; 2) we turn the planet into a garden, with more than enough food growing everywhere, and no need to do anything to satisfy basic needs beyond picking it off the nearest bush... and the food is loaded with tranquilizers and euphoric drugs. Ok? You like these? Do you think one or the other of these is what humanity should aim for? If you leave the ability to think, you're going to have striving, at least by some... so you've got to turn it off, one way or another. But hey, why think, if you've got food, shelter, sex, and (minimal, since we don't think) entertainment? Bread and circuses, like the Romans, right?
You could ask what the difference is between humanity like that and no humanity at all, just blades of grass... I don't see one. I'm not going to present an ethical system with some other basis, although I easily could. I could say that in order to make the scenarios above, or something like them, work, you'd have to change the basic nature of humanity... and then the question becomes: to what do you think it should be changed, and why?
But to give a direct answer: yes. Here's one simple reason: we can't predict the future. If we have a world of contented cattle, they'll need keepers, right? Because something is bound to happen to the system, eventually. Well, who will be our keepers? Robots? Could you trust them a) to do a good job, in the long run... be flexible enough to cope with the unexpected, to not rust away, etc., and b) to not just abandon humanity?
You could ask what the difference is between humanity like that and no humanity at all, just blades of grass... I don't see one. I'm not going to present an ethical system with some other basis, although I easily could. I could say that in order to make the scenarios above, or something like them, work, you'd have to change the basic nature of humanity... and then the question becomes: to what do you think it should be changed, and why?
But to give a direct answer: yes. Here's one simple reason: we can't predict the future. If we have a world of contented cattle, they'll need keepers, right? Because something is bound to happen to the system, eventually. Well, who will be our keepers? Robots? Could you trust them a) to do a good job, in the long run... be flexible enough to cope with the unexpected, to not rust away, etc., and b) to not just abandon humanity?
Sunday, November 6, 2011
Is Democracy the ‘Least Worst’ Form of Government?
The question assumes that government is for some purpose or set of purposes, and that the only dimension of assessment of different forms of government is how well, or how badly they accomplish their objectives. However, if a political philosopher were to put forward the argument that democracy is the only acceptable form of government — for example, that our duty of obedience to the state can only hold if the state is ruled by a democratically elected government — then it would not matter if democracy was the worst of all possible arrangements for getting things done.
That is not the only principled argument for democracy. Another argument is that the fundamental assumption of human equality is inconsistent with any form of government other than a democratic one.
Are there limits on the duty of obedience to the state? — This is the classic question of political philosophy. Roughly, the reasons given fall into two main categories. Either we are morally obliged to obey the state, in which case the question is how far this obligation extends before it is overridden by other, conflicting moral obligations. Or it is in our own best long-term interest, all things considered, to obey the state, in which case the question is under what circumstances one might make the well founded judgment that disobedience was in one's best long-term interests. My own inclination is towards the first, rather than the second strategy.
On the view that our obligation to obey the state is a moral obligation, it would seem to be that there can be other moral obligations which override it. When a moral claim is overridden, that does not imply that the claim itself is invalid. However, the moral obligation to obey the state is itself conditional on certain requirements being fulfilled. Consider the case of the Israeli who gave away his country's atomic secrets. It is possible that he simply believed he was responding to an overriding moral imperative? An alternative explanation is that he believed that his government, in secretly stockpiling weapons without a democratic mandate had forfeited its moral claim on his obedience.
That is not the only principled argument for democracy. Another argument is that the fundamental assumption of human equality is inconsistent with any form of government other than a democratic one.
Are there limits on the duty of obedience to the state? — This is the classic question of political philosophy. Roughly, the reasons given fall into two main categories. Either we are morally obliged to obey the state, in which case the question is how far this obligation extends before it is overridden by other, conflicting moral obligations. Or it is in our own best long-term interest, all things considered, to obey the state, in which case the question is under what circumstances one might make the well founded judgment that disobedience was in one's best long-term interests. My own inclination is towards the first, rather than the second strategy.
On the view that our obligation to obey the state is a moral obligation, it would seem to be that there can be other moral obligations which override it. When a moral claim is overridden, that does not imply that the claim itself is invalid. However, the moral obligation to obey the state is itself conditional on certain requirements being fulfilled. Consider the case of the Israeli who gave away his country's atomic secrets. It is possible that he simply believed he was responding to an overriding moral imperative? An alternative explanation is that he believed that his government, in secretly stockpiling weapons without a democratic mandate had forfeited its moral claim on his obedience.
Sunday, October 30, 2011
What is God?
There are a number of conceptions of 'God' each peculiar to a religion. A prevalent conception of 'God' is of a supreme being with a number of different properties like omnipotence, omniscience, infinite goodness, and a number of others. But that is the concept of God. So the concept of 'God' certainly exists. However, whether anything answers to that concept, or any other concept of 'God' is a very different matter. That is the matter of whether there is a God, or whether God exists. We should never confuse the concept of 'God' with God, and think that because the first exists, so does the second. That would be a mistake in logic.
Sunday, October 23, 2011
What Does Plato’s Allegory of the Cave Intend to Teach Us?
In Plato's underground cave there are people chained and shackled so that they can only see one wall. Behind them is a fire casting its light upon the wall. Between the fire and the people is a roadway through which other people travel carrying all kinds of objects which cast shadows on the wall.
The chained people take these shadows to be realities. However if one of them were to be released and allowed to look around or even to leave the cave into the clear light of day he would realize that in fact the shadows were not reality.
I think the allegory of the cave is meant to be more than just a way of saying that if we rely on our sense perception we will never attain knowledge, but always be subject to the world of appearance. Rather there is a stronger message that through our intellectual capacities and philosophy in particular we can break the chains that "fetter us" we can aim for the light we can be enlightened. In other words by becoming philosophers we can be free!
There is as well a second part to the allegory. The freed person returns to the cave and is subject to ridicule and danger. Clearly he would not be happy with this situation. But one of the things we learn to see outside the cave, in fact the highest source of knowledge is that of Goodness. In the larger context of ‘The Republic’ (from which the allegory is taken) Plato wishes to describe the ideal state for mankind. Plato thinks that knowledge of Goodness is required in order to run such an ideal community. However those with such knowledge, like the man sent back to the cave are reluctant to go. Bizarre or brilliant depending on how one views Plato, it is those who least want power and responsibility that should have it.
The chained people take these shadows to be realities. However if one of them were to be released and allowed to look around or even to leave the cave into the clear light of day he would realize that in fact the shadows were not reality.
I think the allegory of the cave is meant to be more than just a way of saying that if we rely on our sense perception we will never attain knowledge, but always be subject to the world of appearance. Rather there is a stronger message that through our intellectual capacities and philosophy in particular we can break the chains that "fetter us" we can aim for the light we can be enlightened. In other words by becoming philosophers we can be free!
There is as well a second part to the allegory. The freed person returns to the cave and is subject to ridicule and danger. Clearly he would not be happy with this situation. But one of the things we learn to see outside the cave, in fact the highest source of knowledge is that of Goodness. In the larger context of ‘The Republic’ (from which the allegory is taken) Plato wishes to describe the ideal state for mankind. Plato thinks that knowledge of Goodness is required in order to run such an ideal community. However those with such knowledge, like the man sent back to the cave are reluctant to go. Bizarre or brilliant depending on how one views Plato, it is those who least want power and responsibility that should have it.
Sunday, October 16, 2011
Is Eating People Wrong?
Yes. Kant had the answer to this one: it is immoral to treat a person as an object. If you eat someone, that's what you're doing. Now, there is an interesting variant on this, however. One could conceive of ritual cannibalism, where one eats the dead to show respect for them to symbolically join with them by taking them into oneself, as moral, because then you're treating them as people, not as food. The ritual cannibalism (yes, "communion") of the Catholic Church is something like this. Is that kind of cannibalism moral? I'm not sure, but it seems that it could be, with suitable respect for the dead. But aside from that kind of cannibalism, using a person as food is denying their humanity.
But, what if you're on a desert island, a ship lost at sea, or whatever, and you and some others are starving... and someone dies. Is it moral to eat them? I'd say yes, myself... I'd want to be eaten in those circumstances, anyway, if it was me that died first. What's the difference between that and, say, donating your organs after you die to medicine, to save lives?
Now there's another kind of cannibalism which I have not really thought through as to its morality, and that's where human beings might clone their own flesh to feed themselves, in some future where food is scarce. Is eating cloned human meat, grown in a vat a) cannibalism, b) immoral? After all, that's nearly what we do now with chickens, commercially. Does it make a difference what the meat is, genetically? My take on this is that it's only our cultural conditioning which makes us feel that this is repulsive and immoral, and that there's not any real immorality there; humans are not treated as objects or as food; there's just meat with human genes. On the other hand, taking human genes and employing them in this fashion, it might be argued, is using the human blueprint, at least, in a way that denigrates it and that opens the door to real abuses. That's certainly a reasonable response, and that's why I don't know the answer to this one... I don't have what I'd consider a decisive reply to it. Which isn't to say there isn't one... maybe there isn't; or perhaps I just haven't thought of it yet.
But, what if you're on a desert island, a ship lost at sea, or whatever, and you and some others are starving... and someone dies. Is it moral to eat them? I'd say yes, myself... I'd want to be eaten in those circumstances, anyway, if it was me that died first. What's the difference between that and, say, donating your organs after you die to medicine, to save lives?
Now there's another kind of cannibalism which I have not really thought through as to its morality, and that's where human beings might clone their own flesh to feed themselves, in some future where food is scarce. Is eating cloned human meat, grown in a vat a) cannibalism, b) immoral? After all, that's nearly what we do now with chickens, commercially. Does it make a difference what the meat is, genetically? My take on this is that it's only our cultural conditioning which makes us feel that this is repulsive and immoral, and that there's not any real immorality there; humans are not treated as objects or as food; there's just meat with human genes. On the other hand, taking human genes and employing them in this fashion, it might be argued, is using the human blueprint, at least, in a way that denigrates it and that opens the door to real abuses. That's certainly a reasonable response, and that's why I don't know the answer to this one... I don't have what I'd consider a decisive reply to it. Which isn't to say there isn't one... maybe there isn't; or perhaps I just haven't thought of it yet.
Sunday, October 9, 2011
If You Don’t Know You’re Unhappy are You?
It seems a paradox to say that a person could be unhappy, even though they didn't think that they were unhappy. Surely happiness is a feeling which you know you have, if you have it, and know you don't have if you don't have it.
The Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle would not agree with what I have just said. He had a conception of 'happiness' as more than simply a subjective feeling but rather a judgment that we make about the quality of a person's life. A man who is being cheated on by his wife is not 'happy' according to Aristotle's definition, even if he is blissfully unaware of the fact and thinks that he is the happiest man in the world.
You might reply that Aristotle is not talking about 'happiness' per se, but something else. The substantial question is what sort of happiness we should want.
There is another dimension to the problem, however. Since Freud, we have got used to the idea that we are not always aware of how we truly feel. You assert you are happy, and as you utter the words you seem to believe what you say. Yet deep inside there is a gnawing unhappiness which is causing you to 'act out' in various ways, spoiling relationships and hurting people. Freud said that his objective was to transform a person's neuroses into 'generalized unhappiness'. It sometimes seems as if he thought that everyone ought to be 'unhappy'.
The Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle would not agree with what I have just said. He had a conception of 'happiness' as more than simply a subjective feeling but rather a judgment that we make about the quality of a person's life. A man who is being cheated on by his wife is not 'happy' according to Aristotle's definition, even if he is blissfully unaware of the fact and thinks that he is the happiest man in the world.
You might reply that Aristotle is not talking about 'happiness' per se, but something else. The substantial question is what sort of happiness we should want.
There is another dimension to the problem, however. Since Freud, we have got used to the idea that we are not always aware of how we truly feel. You assert you are happy, and as you utter the words you seem to believe what you say. Yet deep inside there is a gnawing unhappiness which is causing you to 'act out' in various ways, spoiling relationships and hurting people. Freud said that his objective was to transform a person's neuroses into 'generalized unhappiness'. It sometimes seems as if he thought that everyone ought to be 'unhappy'.
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Are There Questions We Can’t Ask Because the Answers Cannot be Known?
The question we are asking is a question of metaphysics, which concerns our understanding of the concept of truth. If a question can be asked, one of the things which follows from that is that we can grasp what it would mean for that question to have an answer. Of course, not all questions which have answers, are questions we can answer. For example, most people would agree that the question how many times I clicked the mouse today has an answer, but if I am not running a program on my computer which counts mouse clicks, then barring total recall there is no way I can discover what that answer is. I can ask the question, but I cannot answer it.
But now consider the question: ‘Has there ever been, in the history of the universe, a period of time during which absolutely nothing happened?’ In other words, can there be such a thing as an empty time? If you allow that there might, sometimes, occur periods of empty time, then it follows that it is logically possible that in between each key tap as I write these words, the universe stops still for a million years. There is a case for saying that because we cannot conceive of what it would be to 'know' that an empty time has ever occurred, that is one question we cannot even ask.
But now consider the question: ‘Has there ever been, in the history of the universe, a period of time during which absolutely nothing happened?’ In other words, can there be such a thing as an empty time? If you allow that there might, sometimes, occur periods of empty time, then it follows that it is logically possible that in between each key tap as I write these words, the universe stops still for a million years. There is a case for saying that because we cannot conceive of what it would be to 'know' that an empty time has ever occurred, that is one question we cannot even ask.
Sunday, September 25, 2011
Is Atheism Logically Untenable?
Must we keep an open mind about God, even those of us who are skeptical about the grounds for theism?
Let me first give some examples of things I personally do not feel I need to keep an open mind about. You may or may not agree:
I do not need to keep an open mind about whether it is possible for someone to predict events that will happen in my life by observing the movements of the planets and stars, or reading the lines on my palm.
I do not need to keep an open mind about the claims of Scientology.
I do not need to keep an open mind about Hitler's responsibility for the Holocaust.
Isn't it irrational of me to be dogmatic, when there are people who believe in astrology and palmistry, or in Scientology, or in Hitler's innocence? — Just because people believe something — perhaps lots of people — just because the available evidence does not logically rule out the possibility that their belief is true, is not in itself sufficient reason for suspending judgment. My argument is if you allowed that such considerations were sufficient for suspending judgment, "just think what the consequences would be."
When it comes to the question of the ultimate ground of our existence, we are all profoundly ignorant. All that is left is the practical decision — the existential choice — whether to live in fear of God. However, existential choice still leaves us with three possibilities: we can choose to embrace theism; we can postpone the choice and profess agnosticism; or we can choose to embrace atheism.
In these terms, I would argue, the atheist option is neither untenable nor illogical. What the atheist has and the agnostic lacks, is something akin to religious faith. For those who find such faith supporting and life enhancing, that is sufficient ground for belief.
Let me first give some examples of things I personally do not feel I need to keep an open mind about. You may or may not agree:
I do not need to keep an open mind about whether it is possible for someone to predict events that will happen in my life by observing the movements of the planets and stars, or reading the lines on my palm.
I do not need to keep an open mind about the claims of Scientology.
I do not need to keep an open mind about Hitler's responsibility for the Holocaust.
Isn't it irrational of me to be dogmatic, when there are people who believe in astrology and palmistry, or in Scientology, or in Hitler's innocence? — Just because people believe something — perhaps lots of people — just because the available evidence does not logically rule out the possibility that their belief is true, is not in itself sufficient reason for suspending judgment. My argument is if you allowed that such considerations were sufficient for suspending judgment, "just think what the consequences would be."
When it comes to the question of the ultimate ground of our existence, we are all profoundly ignorant. All that is left is the practical decision — the existential choice — whether to live in fear of God. However, existential choice still leaves us with three possibilities: we can choose to embrace theism; we can postpone the choice and profess agnosticism; or we can choose to embrace atheism.
In these terms, I would argue, the atheist option is neither untenable nor illogical. What the atheist has and the agnostic lacks, is something akin to religious faith. For those who find such faith supporting and life enhancing, that is sufficient ground for belief.
Saturday, September 10, 2011
What is Determinism?
Determinism makes the ideological point that our actions and thought are determined by some universal basis. This universal basis can be language (Bakhtin talks about linguistic determinism), class ideology (Marx talks about determinism of class-consciousness), will (Nietzsche said that everything is determined by will), writing (Derrida says that everything is writing) and so on.
For example, according to linguistic determinism: if one's native language is English one thinks with the help of language as well as one thinks in this language. Language belongs to one as well as one belongs to language. Everything we say in English is contained in the English language. That is why the writer just expresses the structures which are contained in the language to which he belongs.
Language is the tool of thinking, according to Wittgenstein. But it is not a tool like a hammer. So, one can lose one's hammer and yet hit the nail without a hammer. But one can think nothing without language. Really language is the way of thinking. If one's native language is French, you think as Frenchman, you have the logic and world outlook of French culture.
Every language, in my mind, creates its own would outlook, its own culture therefore its own thinking. For example, what color do you associate with happiness? It might be pink or yellow, perhaps? But for the Chinese, black is the symbol of happiness and laughter. Another example, with what do you associate the flower chrysanthemum? For the Japanese, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of death as well as the symbol of the Emperor.
So, there is linguistic determinism: we can think nothing without language. Everything we think belongs to our world outlook (this is ideological determinism too) and to native language (this is linguistic determinism). Every word we think, say or write belongs to our native language, therefore our thinking, saying and writing is determined by our language.
The basis of determinism, in my mind, is the human aspiration to understand the underlying nature of the person. Freud says that a subsection of the person is sexual appetite, therefore he creates the determinism of sexuality. The basis of the person (Ego) in his mind is Id, which embraces all sexual wants and instincts. I think that the philosopher creates determinism to understand and to describe the nature of the human person and to build his own system of philosophical ideology.
For example, according to linguistic determinism: if one's native language is English one thinks with the help of language as well as one thinks in this language. Language belongs to one as well as one belongs to language. Everything we say in English is contained in the English language. That is why the writer just expresses the structures which are contained in the language to which he belongs.
Language is the tool of thinking, according to Wittgenstein. But it is not a tool like a hammer. So, one can lose one's hammer and yet hit the nail without a hammer. But one can think nothing without language. Really language is the way of thinking. If one's native language is French, you think as Frenchman, you have the logic and world outlook of French culture.
Every language, in my mind, creates its own would outlook, its own culture therefore its own thinking. For example, what color do you associate with happiness? It might be pink or yellow, perhaps? But for the Chinese, black is the symbol of happiness and laughter. Another example, with what do you associate the flower chrysanthemum? For the Japanese, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of death as well as the symbol of the Emperor.
So, there is linguistic determinism: we can think nothing without language. Everything we think belongs to our world outlook (this is ideological determinism too) and to native language (this is linguistic determinism). Every word we think, say or write belongs to our native language, therefore our thinking, saying and writing is determined by our language.
The basis of determinism, in my mind, is the human aspiration to understand the underlying nature of the person. Freud says that a subsection of the person is sexual appetite, therefore he creates the determinism of sexuality. The basis of the person (Ego) in his mind is Id, which embraces all sexual wants and instincts. I think that the philosopher creates determinism to understand and to describe the nature of the human person and to build his own system of philosophical ideology.
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Why Can’t Descartes Doubt his Own Existence?
In his First Meditation, Descartes wants to more or less abandon any belief that he can doubt at all. This is a way of finding a belief that is completely certain, a belief that he can be absolutely sure is true. If he cannot find any reason to doubt a belief, even the slightest bit, then it's certain in this sense. And the reason he wants to find such a belief (or such beliefs) is that he thinks that he can then base the rest of his beliefs on them, and he will be able to be sure that his beliefs rest on a secure foundation.
The problem is that he seems to have found skeptical arguments that show that there is no absolutely certain belief, that every belief he has is open to some (perhaps very slight) doubt. These are the skeptical arguments he gives in the First Meditation. It might seem, then, that he's doomed to be without an absolutely certain foundation for the rest of his beliefs. And this, clearly, would be a grave problem for his aims in the Meditations.
But this is where the fact that he cannot doubt his own existence comes in. It turns out that he really cannot doubt the belief that he himself exists. For the mere fact of his trying to doubt that he exists, or of his thinking anything at all, clearly shows him that he does exist: “I think therefore I am.” So there is no doubt, not even a very slight one, that he exists. Consequently, there is at least one belief that is absolutely certain: that he himself exists. So it turns out that there is a belief of the sort he needs to ground the rest of his beliefs on a secure foundation.
The problem is that he seems to have found skeptical arguments that show that there is no absolutely certain belief, that every belief he has is open to some (perhaps very slight) doubt. These are the skeptical arguments he gives in the First Meditation. It might seem, then, that he's doomed to be without an absolutely certain foundation for the rest of his beliefs. And this, clearly, would be a grave problem for his aims in the Meditations.
But this is where the fact that he cannot doubt his own existence comes in. It turns out that he really cannot doubt the belief that he himself exists. For the mere fact of his trying to doubt that he exists, or of his thinking anything at all, clearly shows him that he does exist: “I think therefore I am.” So there is no doubt, not even a very slight one, that he exists. Consequently, there is at least one belief that is absolutely certain: that he himself exists. So it turns out that there is a belief of the sort he needs to ground the rest of his beliefs on a secure foundation.
Saturday, August 27, 2011
Who Am I?
Self-knowledge. On the entrance of the temple of the Delphian Oracle there was written: "know thy self.” That question of self-cognition was the basic point of Socrates' philosophical dialogues in the Athenian market place. It is a serious philosophical theme. I consider this theme as one of the most labored for philosophical consciousness. Not only because of the difficulty of self-cognition, but because there is not just one way of self-cognition for all people. Everyone should accomplish this knowledge self-sufficiently.
What can we learn from our life experience? What can one know about one's self? Selfhood seems to be the most clear matter. Everyone knows oneself best of all things. Also, only man it seems can know himself. One really knows oneself before all other knowledge. A newborn infant knows nothing, but is first noticed to recognize himself before the age of five. A lot of children prior to that age use time and again the word "I". I am, I can, I want, and I do and so on. Self-consciousness appears at that age and it becomes a man's first and deepest knowledge. Before that age, a child does not separate himself from the world around him. Therefore, we can not affirm the existence of consciousness before self-consciousness. The first manifestation of one's consciousness becomes one's self-consciousness.
What can we learn from our life experience? What can one know about one's self? Selfhood seems to be the most clear matter. Everyone knows oneself best of all things. Also, only man it seems can know himself. One really knows oneself before all other knowledge. A newborn infant knows nothing, but is first noticed to recognize himself before the age of five. A lot of children prior to that age use time and again the word "I". I am, I can, I want, and I do and so on. Self-consciousness appears at that age and it becomes a man's first and deepest knowledge. Before that age, a child does not separate himself from the world around him. Therefore, we can not affirm the existence of consciousness before self-consciousness. The first manifestation of one's consciousness becomes one's self-consciousness.
Saturday, August 20, 2011
What is the Difference Between Internal and External Freedom?
Internally, we have the freedom of thought and reason, the freedom to deliberate and decide. However, there are restrictions on decisions, choices and desires which come from external facts so we are not always free to act as we want.
Although our desires and choices are internal in the sense that they issue from us and no-one can desire or choose for us, the satisfaction of desires can prove difficult or impossible when the means are not available. Desires may arise freely internally but we do not have the freedom to satisfy them whenever we want to so the ability to satisfy our desires cannot be regarded as entirely free. The same is true for choices. There may be a range of choices, but what we really want may not be an available option. An example of lack of freedom of choice is the "money or your life" situation. You cannot choose that the person making the threat should take your life and keep the money, because if he kills you he gets the money anyway. But while external circumstances limit your choice in this situation, there is still a sense in which you choose. The person who makes the threat may be understood as forcing the obvious choice upon you, but it is still you who chooses.
Internal freedom is freedom as a power which belongs to you and which you exercise even when compelled. You may hand over your money unwillingly in the sense that you don't want to, but you have to do it from choice or free will in another sense because the action is performed by you.
However, there are other external factors which affect freedom of choice and desire. If we understand by external factors those forces which limit or restrict freedom, there exists facts about your background and character, as well as unconscious forces. These facts are internal in the sense that they are facts about your person but because they have an affect on, or determine, the nature of your desires and the kind of choices you make, these facts also restrain inner freedom. Some things you cannot choose.
So we are free sometimes and in some ways. Internal freedom is the power to choose and the ability to desire, in addition to the power to be able to think.
Although our desires and choices are internal in the sense that they issue from us and no-one can desire or choose for us, the satisfaction of desires can prove difficult or impossible when the means are not available. Desires may arise freely internally but we do not have the freedom to satisfy them whenever we want to so the ability to satisfy our desires cannot be regarded as entirely free. The same is true for choices. There may be a range of choices, but what we really want may not be an available option. An example of lack of freedom of choice is the "money or your life" situation. You cannot choose that the person making the threat should take your life and keep the money, because if he kills you he gets the money anyway. But while external circumstances limit your choice in this situation, there is still a sense in which you choose. The person who makes the threat may be understood as forcing the obvious choice upon you, but it is still you who chooses.
Internal freedom is freedom as a power which belongs to you and which you exercise even when compelled. You may hand over your money unwillingly in the sense that you don't want to, but you have to do it from choice or free will in another sense because the action is performed by you.
However, there are other external factors which affect freedom of choice and desire. If we understand by external factors those forces which limit or restrict freedom, there exists facts about your background and character, as well as unconscious forces. These facts are internal in the sense that they are facts about your person but because they have an affect on, or determine, the nature of your desires and the kind of choices you make, these facts also restrain inner freedom. Some things you cannot choose.
So we are free sometimes and in some ways. Internal freedom is the power to choose and the ability to desire, in addition to the power to be able to think.
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Is Philosophy Significant to Anyone Else but a Philosopher?
Yes, I think it is widely significant. There are two main reasons I think this. Firstly, everybody, when they try to think a little more deeply about their beliefs and the assumptions they rest upon (or even better, discuss this with friends) is to that extent a philosopher. And this can have some quite profound effects on people.
Secondly, philosophical ideas produced by 'real philosophers' (whatever they are) can have effects far beyond their recognized reach. It is true that many philosophers are read only by other philosophers — or people who are close to philosophy. The views of these people are affected. They then can write about other matters — political, ethical, whatever, in a way that is affected by the philosophical views they have read. Others read this, and in turn write or speak. In this way, philosophical views spread and influence many facets of our lives.
Let me give some examples. The ideas of John Locke about how to run a state affected the writings of many, notably the American founding fathers. The U.S. Constitution is organized in accordance with them. This has had pretty wide effects, I think you would agree.
Or a couple of others. Immanuel Kant's writings on reason heavily influences the Enlightenment — ideas that progress is inevitable and that objective reasoning leads to better actions. Friedrich Nietzsche's criticisms of this approach have led to a world in which such objective thinking and central planning, based on the belief that there is one right answer to every problem, is now widely mistrusted.
I probably don't need to expand on the influence of Karl Marx — basically a philosopher of sorts — who said famously: "Philosophers have previously interpreted the world. The point, however, is to change it." Anybody who sets out to change the world, however, must first have interpreted it, and although they may not recognize it explicitly, that interpretation is likely to have been influenced by the positions of philosophers.
Secondly, philosophical ideas produced by 'real philosophers' (whatever they are) can have effects far beyond their recognized reach. It is true that many philosophers are read only by other philosophers — or people who are close to philosophy. The views of these people are affected. They then can write about other matters — political, ethical, whatever, in a way that is affected by the philosophical views they have read. Others read this, and in turn write or speak. In this way, philosophical views spread and influence many facets of our lives.
Let me give some examples. The ideas of John Locke about how to run a state affected the writings of many, notably the American founding fathers. The U.S. Constitution is organized in accordance with them. This has had pretty wide effects, I think you would agree.
Or a couple of others. Immanuel Kant's writings on reason heavily influences the Enlightenment — ideas that progress is inevitable and that objective reasoning leads to better actions. Friedrich Nietzsche's criticisms of this approach have led to a world in which such objective thinking and central planning, based on the belief that there is one right answer to every problem, is now widely mistrusted.
I probably don't need to expand on the influence of Karl Marx — basically a philosopher of sorts — who said famously: "Philosophers have previously interpreted the world. The point, however, is to change it." Anybody who sets out to change the world, however, must first have interpreted it, and although they may not recognize it explicitly, that interpretation is likely to have been influenced by the positions of philosophers.
Saturday, August 6, 2011
What is a Determinist’s View of Punishment?
The question is often asked: If all human action is determined, then how can we punish criminals, since they couldn't do otherwise? But if all human action is determined, the action of punishing criminals is determined just as much as the action of committing crimes! The determinism debate is haunted by the specter of a criminal saying to a judge that he cannot be convicted, because all freedom is destroyed by determinism, and all he really could do was therefore to commit crimes. But such a criminal is in no position to complain if the judge replies to him that because all freedom is destroyed by determinism, all he, the judge, really can do is therefore to find him guilty and sentence him.
Sunday, July 31, 2011
What is Philosophical Skepticism?
"Skepticism" derives from the Greek word for "doubt." The Skeptic is one who doubts. But, doubts what? Here we should distinguish between "ordinary skepticism," and "philosophical skepticism."
In ordinary language and circumstances, a skeptic will doubt that something exists or is true. For instance, he will, if he is a (ordinary) "religious skeptic," doubt whether God exists. Or, if he is a (ordinary) moral skeptic, he will doubt whether anything has any moral value (whatever he may mean by that.)
But a philosophical skeptic directs his doubts against knowledge. He will, unlike the religious skeptic discussed above, say, "I can know whether or not God exists.” But this is compatible with not being an ordinary religious skeptic: For the philosophical religious skeptic (unlike the ordinary religious skeptic who doubts the existence of God) may, consistent with his philosophical skepticism still believe in God! He says he knows there is a God, but that doesn't prevent him from believing in God.
The great 18th century British philosopher, David Hume is, I believe, best understood as a philosophical skeptic. He believed many things he thought it was impossible for anyone to know. For instance, he believed that there was an "external material world" beyond our senses, but also held that it was impossible to know such a thing.
In ordinary language and circumstances, a skeptic will doubt that something exists or is true. For instance, he will, if he is a (ordinary) "religious skeptic," doubt whether God exists. Or, if he is a (ordinary) moral skeptic, he will doubt whether anything has any moral value (whatever he may mean by that.)
But a philosophical skeptic directs his doubts against knowledge. He will, unlike the religious skeptic discussed above, say, "I can know whether or not God exists.” But this is compatible with not being an ordinary religious skeptic: For the philosophical religious skeptic (unlike the ordinary religious skeptic who doubts the existence of God) may, consistent with his philosophical skepticism still believe in God! He says he knows there is a God, but that doesn't prevent him from believing in God.
The great 18th century British philosopher, David Hume is, I believe, best understood as a philosophical skeptic. He believed many things he thought it was impossible for anyone to know. For instance, he believed that there was an "external material world" beyond our senses, but also held that it was impossible to know such a thing.
Monday, July 25, 2011
Could a Computer Behave as a Person?
In certain respects, possibly all, a computer could behave as a person. It couldn't be a person though. The human mind may have developed because of need. But perhaps also because of desire to continue to live, individually and collectively. Could a computer have such a desire? Maybe (think of HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey). But consciousness would be essential to a desire for survival and I don't think self-consciousness is programmable.
And even if a computer could behave like a person, it couldn't be a person as there is more to a human than determinate programmable input can create. How can we program in the ability to love, for instance? We can't even define it.
And even if a computer could behave like a person, it couldn't be a person as there is more to a human than determinate programmable input can create. How can we program in the ability to love, for instance? We can't even define it.
Monday, July 18, 2011
What is Moral Relativism?
'Moral relativism' is one of the responses you sometimes hear people give in cases of ethical conflict. For example the Romans fed Christians to wild beasts and kept slaves as gladiators, whereas we do not, and regard it as wrong. You can either respond that we are morally more enlightened than the Romans were, that we today have got it right; or you can opt for the relativistic line that there is no answer to these kinds of question. So moral relativism is a denial that there is any single moral code that has universal validity.
Relativists need not deny that there is such a thing as moral truth, although their account of truth will be very different from an absolutist like Kant. Moral truth, to the relativist, is relative to factors which are culturally and historically contingent. So you can be an ethical relativist about truth and justifiability. The wide variety of ethical beliefs in the world is perhaps a point in its favor. How do you even assess the truth of something outside of your own background, language and community?
You can also be a relativist in a slightly different, 'normative' way. This would be to say that we ought to hold that the values of others are as valid as our own. Anthropology has thrown up an exotic array of practices from distant cultures which we simply cannot relate to and even find distasteful (infanticide, cannibalism, head-hunting etc). A moral relativist might claim that we have no normative grounds for judging these kinds of practice by our own moral standards.
Relativists need not deny that there is such a thing as moral truth, although their account of truth will be very different from an absolutist like Kant. Moral truth, to the relativist, is relative to factors which are culturally and historically contingent. So you can be an ethical relativist about truth and justifiability. The wide variety of ethical beliefs in the world is perhaps a point in its favor. How do you even assess the truth of something outside of your own background, language and community?
You can also be a relativist in a slightly different, 'normative' way. This would be to say that we ought to hold that the values of others are as valid as our own. Anthropology has thrown up an exotic array of practices from distant cultures which we simply cannot relate to and even find distasteful (infanticide, cannibalism, head-hunting etc). A moral relativist might claim that we have no normative grounds for judging these kinds of practice by our own moral standards.
Monday, July 11, 2011
How Did Religion Evolve?
There are many theories which try to explain why there is religion. Freud understood it as a kind of universal psychosis. Emile Durkheim, the great sociologist tried to understand it as performing the function of uniting a community. Karl Marx understood is as "the opiate of the masses." He argued that the ruling class provides it to the working class to keep them subservient. I think that, at least in part, religion developed as an attempt to explain natural phenomena (earthquakes, thunder, etc.); a kind of primitive science. The easiest explanation for anything is always that "someone did it." Of course, the rise of science has tended to pull the explanatory rug out from under religion since what science can explain, religion doesn't have to. It is because of that there is an important conflict between religion and science, that some (mistakenly, in my opinion) tend to downplay.
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
Do We Need a Government?
People feel a need for a government — I include dictatorships here — because the alternative is anarchy and the lack of organization implied would be difficult to accept in an advanced culture.
A government is also able to maintain relations with other states, so that in advanced cultures we are able to take advantage of cheap workforces, goods and raw materials from less developed countries. This seems to be becoming a global goal which the international anarchist movement is trying to put an end to. It is this goal, rather the concept of a government, which is wrong.
The role of a government is to maintain a legal system, impose taxes and distribute wealth in a way the people think is just.
I think this is John Locke's view. Locke thought that people want a government because of the inconveniences of a state of nature which is lawless. It can be argued against this that the impositions and restrictions maintained by government are not actually preferable to a lawless state of nature, but unless we are able to live in small self-sufficient communities — which we do not seem to want to do — then government is necessary.
A government is also able to maintain relations with other states, so that in advanced cultures we are able to take advantage of cheap workforces, goods and raw materials from less developed countries. This seems to be becoming a global goal which the international anarchist movement is trying to put an end to. It is this goal, rather the concept of a government, which is wrong.
The role of a government is to maintain a legal system, impose taxes and distribute wealth in a way the people think is just.
I think this is John Locke's view. Locke thought that people want a government because of the inconveniences of a state of nature which is lawless. It can be argued against this that the impositions and restrictions maintained by government are not actually preferable to a lawless state of nature, but unless we are able to live in small self-sufficient communities — which we do not seem to want to do — then government is necessary.
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