John Stuart Mill would say that it is okay for white supremacists to march in a black neighborhood, so long as they do not harm those living in the area, or encourage others to harm them. And so long as they do not prevent those living in the neighborhood from expressing their own opinion or marching themselves. This is because Mill argues that we are free to do what we want providing what we do does not harm others. Mill also argues that mere offense or distaste does not constitute harm, so the white supremacists would be allowed, and perhaps even encouraged by Mill to march.
Now there are problems for Mill in saying just what it means to harm someone, or the limits of encouragement that is allowable, but generally most people would perhaps agree with his views. There are however opponents that would disagree with Mill. I think we can identify three major types: one that is call 'free speech hypocrites', a second which could be called 'free speech humanitarians'. Both of these work within Mill’s framework and disagree with the details of Mill's theory. But a third opponent is one who would reject entirely what Mill has to say about liberty.
Free speech hypocrites are all those like the white supremacists, who argue the case for freedom of speech as a constitutional right under law, so that they can march, but only appeal to the value of free speech in order to actively deny such rights to others, namely those living in the black neighborhood. Such opponents would not accept the consequence of Mill's view that everyone has the freedom to do what they want. They would not want others to be free to march against them.
The second group agrees with Mill that liberty is a good thing and free speech should be permitted, but disagree with Mill that whatever its content, free speech does no harm. They would argue that racism, homophobia, fascism, and other prejudiced beliefs are harmful and should be prevented from being freely expressed. The problem here is that no matter what anyone says it will offend someone; should we therefore ban all differing opinion, or offensive behavior?
The third opponent does not agree with Mill that free speech or individual liberty is necessarily a good state of affairs. They usually would argue that individual freedom leads to unfulfilled lives. Such opponents would find support in the works of Plato and Aristotle, who argue the need to live the Good Life, a life that is defined by the role one plays within a society. Thomas Hobbes would also disagree with Mill. He thinks that individual freedom must be sacrificed to a powerful sovereign if those individuals are to avoid war and conflict.
I do not think that Hobbes would allow the white supremacists to march, if the march would lead to frustration or harm the black community, because it would them mean that there was an imbalance in the freedom given up by some. If this imbalance was corrected by the sovereign allowing the blacks to have their own march, it would lead to frustration on the other side, possibly resulting in conflict, and so the sovereign would not be doing his job. The only way the sovereign could protect all the members of society would be to ban the march in the first place. Freedom is given up for the sake of peace and survival.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Friday, March 18, 2011
Why Study Philosophy?
The study of philosophy is really only the recognition and placing on a formal and justified footing of what everyone always already does; because all of us act and think in terms of some 'philosophy' that guides, steers or orients us. We perceive things in terms of our 'philosophy'. How many people are victims of the philosophy of others? The answer is probably, most people. And how much of other people's philosophy has been neither examined or only ill examined by them? The answer, again, is probably, most of it. That is a scary thought. Another example of our pre-existing relationship with philosophy that all of us always already have, is relationships, and love in particular. Our ideas about relationships and other people guide our behavior. The way we react to other people's behavior toward our self in relationships affects our self-regard. We form habits from our beliefs that have arisen out of our patterns of thought, which have become ingrained. In short, the way we think is the essence of the way we are.
If, then, we turn our thinking upon itself, if we decide to improve this area of our being, we will need to study philosophy. Of course there are different methods of study and different areas of philosophy that we might take up. The point here is that we are already caught up in philosophy whether we like it or not. The choice to take up philosophy in this or that way, or to take up this or that kind of philosophy is itself philosophical. I am not taking you round in circular arguments here: the fact is that philosophy is embracing. A human being cannot step outside its embrace without ceasing to be human.
So, philosophy is for people who want a life that is more worth living and to live in a world which is a better place. This "more" and this "better" depend on philosophy, no matter what the circumstances.
If, then, we turn our thinking upon itself, if we decide to improve this area of our being, we will need to study philosophy. Of course there are different methods of study and different areas of philosophy that we might take up. The point here is that we are already caught up in philosophy whether we like it or not. The choice to take up philosophy in this or that way, or to take up this or that kind of philosophy is itself philosophical. I am not taking you round in circular arguments here: the fact is that philosophy is embracing. A human being cannot step outside its embrace without ceasing to be human.
So, philosophy is for people who want a life that is more worth living and to live in a world which is a better place. This "more" and this "better" depend on philosophy, no matter what the circumstances.
Friday, March 11, 2011
Can Faith Be Rational?
The answer we get is apt to differ from philosopher to philosopher, since religion is an emotional topic.
It seems to me that religious belief should be thought of as similar to all other beliefs (although, of course, very important to those who have it). Faith seems to me as just a kind of belief, although, no doubt very fervent belief. It is, therefore, not an alternative to belief, but like all beliefs, it needs reasons for it to be a rational belief. It seems to me a bad error to say something like, "I don't need reason because I believe 'on faith'." That treats faith as a kind of reason, when, in fact, it isn't. It (to repeat) needs reasons. So, to say "I believe on faith (or worse 'on the grounds of faith')" is only to say, "I believe because I believe." So faith (or religious belief) is not rational on its own. It is rational only if it is backed up by reason.
Sometimes, faith is identified with revelation: direct communication with God. The philosopher, John Locke, pointed out that even if we accept (as he thought we must) that revelation is true, since it is the direct word of God, nevertheless we have to determine whether what we believe is a revelation really is a revelation and not, perhaps, from the Devil, or because we are under the influence of some drug. And the only way to decide that is by reason. So even in the case of revelation, reason trumps faith.
It seems to me that religious belief should be thought of as similar to all other beliefs (although, of course, very important to those who have it). Faith seems to me as just a kind of belief, although, no doubt very fervent belief. It is, therefore, not an alternative to belief, but like all beliefs, it needs reasons for it to be a rational belief. It seems to me a bad error to say something like, "I don't need reason because I believe 'on faith'." That treats faith as a kind of reason, when, in fact, it isn't. It (to repeat) needs reasons. So, to say "I believe on faith (or worse 'on the grounds of faith')" is only to say, "I believe because I believe." So faith (or religious belief) is not rational on its own. It is rational only if it is backed up by reason.
Sometimes, faith is identified with revelation: direct communication with God. The philosopher, John Locke, pointed out that even if we accept (as he thought we must) that revelation is true, since it is the direct word of God, nevertheless we have to determine whether what we believe is a revelation really is a revelation and not, perhaps, from the Devil, or because we are under the influence of some drug. And the only way to decide that is by reason. So even in the case of revelation, reason trumps faith.
Friday, March 4, 2011
Are You Responsible for Everything that Happens to You in your Life?
To me it seems that the obvious answer is 'no'. I am not responsible for things which are beyond my control. If a meteorite were to crash through my roof right now and smash off my big toe, I would not be responsible for the loss of my big toe.
However, if I have a choice which directly, in a manner I have foreseen, leads to the outcome, then I am responsible. So, if I know that pushing this glass will knock it off the table, and that it is then likely to break, and do it anyway, then I am responsible for breaking the glass.
Complications enter in several different ways. What about when I ought to have foreseen the outcome, but did not? To me, it seems that I am still responsible to the degree that it was an easy and obvious possible outcome to predict, and that I was negligent in not foreseeing it. This sets up a continuum of responsibility, from full to lesser.
Similarly, I may be an actor in a complex situation where the actions of other actors all contribute to the outcome. Here, I can also be only partly responsible, to the extent that my own actions contributed foreseeably to the whole situation (German Nazi’s for example).
I might add that it is becoming increasingly common (in our culture of victimhood) to claim that I am not responsible for my actions because some outside event means that I did not choose freely. For example, I am not responsible for my choice to rob you, because my parents beat me as a child. I find this trend deeply disturbing and dangerous to our society.
However, if I have a choice which directly, in a manner I have foreseen, leads to the outcome, then I am responsible. So, if I know that pushing this glass will knock it off the table, and that it is then likely to break, and do it anyway, then I am responsible for breaking the glass.
Complications enter in several different ways. What about when I ought to have foreseen the outcome, but did not? To me, it seems that I am still responsible to the degree that it was an easy and obvious possible outcome to predict, and that I was negligent in not foreseeing it. This sets up a continuum of responsibility, from full to lesser.
Similarly, I may be an actor in a complex situation where the actions of other actors all contribute to the outcome. Here, I can also be only partly responsible, to the extent that my own actions contributed foreseeably to the whole situation (German Nazi’s for example).
I might add that it is becoming increasingly common (in our culture of victimhood) to claim that I am not responsible for my actions because some outside event means that I did not choose freely. For example, I am not responsible for my choice to rob you, because my parents beat me as a child. I find this trend deeply disturbing and dangerous to our society.
Friday, February 25, 2011
What is Destiny and Does it Exist?
I am not interested in the standard, question-begging explanations of where the alleged false belief in destiny comes from. Of how and why we fall under the illusion that there are things we are destined to do, or the illusion that we possess a destiny. "There must be a reason why the world is the way it is, it can't just be an accident." Or, "There must be a reason why I am here, in the world, it can't just be an accident." So the explanation proceeds, we are led to invent a reason that exists 'out there' — perhaps a reason that God knows — all the while totally unaware that 'the reason out there' is merely a creature of our own imagination.
A more contemporary, but no less question-begging explanation is the idea that we are story-telling creatures, that we feel impelled to construct a coherent narrative that makes sense of the events and the decisions in our lives. As in the previous explanation, the sense of destiny is supposedly revealed as nothing but an illusion, an invention, a prop. The fact that you or I might find it difficult or impossible to live without that invention does not make it any less an illusion.
Both styles of explanation may be described as reductive: There is no such thing, in reality, as destiny. The belief in destiny has a cause. But the description of that cause does not involve the concept of destiny. In the same way, the belief, in the Middle Ages, that there were such things as witches who possessed supernatural powers derived from the Devil had a cause. Understanding that cause does not require that we believe in the actual existence of witches. The belief in destiny is false, just as the belief in witches is false.
A more contemporary, but no less question-begging explanation is the idea that we are story-telling creatures, that we feel impelled to construct a coherent narrative that makes sense of the events and the decisions in our lives. As in the previous explanation, the sense of destiny is supposedly revealed as nothing but an illusion, an invention, a prop. The fact that you or I might find it difficult or impossible to live without that invention does not make it any less an illusion.
Both styles of explanation may be described as reductive: There is no such thing, in reality, as destiny. The belief in destiny has a cause. But the description of that cause does not involve the concept of destiny. In the same way, the belief, in the Middle Ages, that there were such things as witches who possessed supernatural powers derived from the Devil had a cause. Understanding that cause does not require that we believe in the actual existence of witches. The belief in destiny is false, just as the belief in witches is false.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Can True Happiness Be Achieved By Taking a Pill?
There is a tradition in philosophy going back to Aristotle which contrasts the subjective feeling of happiness with objective reality. We can only call a man or woman truly happy provided that certain objective conditions are met. So that a man who died thinking he had been the happiest man alive, could not be said to have been truly happy if his wife and family, and the people he believed to be his closest friends despised him.
You would no doubt reply that Aristotelian happiness embodying as it does a moral judgment about the quality of a person's life, is not a scientific concept. In any case, it does not follow from the fact that no-one would want that kind of deluded happiness, that in such a situation one would not in fact be happy.
It is important that we are talking about happiness and not the sensation of pleasure. In a famous experiment, monkeys' brains were wired so that by pressing a button, they experienced intense pleasure. The result was that the monkeys could not leave the button alone, and died of starvation. Perhaps the same would happen to humans. However, a happiness pill is not a pleasure pill.
What would a happiness pill do? It would fill you with energy and a joy for life. The dullest task would be undertaken with a relish. The pain of failure would be minimized, the joys of success magnified a hundredfold. One would be filled with the love of humanity. One would be incapable of envy or malice. I am not talking about drugging yourself up with Ecstasy tablets and dancing until you drop. The effect would be precisely the effect that is attained by a few fortunate persons through philosophy or religion: a feeling of serene, confident joy.
"How can this be genuine happiness if it is purchased so cheaply?" Well, we could make the tablet really expensive!...Seriously, I can't see that price has anything to do with it, whether measured either in monetary terms, or in terms of human striving and effort.
No, I don't see how one could rule out that there might be such a pill some day. Or, better still, let's suppose one could re-write a few lines of human genetic code to achieve the desired effect. Then there would be no danger of coming down to earth with a thump when the pill supply ran out.
We need not take seriously the skeptics who complain that they prefer to remain unhappy in the face of the world's miseries, because the kind of happiness I am talking about is a spur to action rather than a temptation to complacency. And besides, there wouldn't be any misery. With the happiness pill, or with your genetic code altered, you could be happy, even in the face of imminent starvation.
I just have this suspicion that it wouldn't work. Not necessarily for any reason that can be derived from philosophy, but because of the complex nature of human psychology. Because we do not understand enough about the psychology of happiness, we imagine that you could take one aspect of our mental life and turn it up, the way one might turn up one of the control buttons on an I-Pod, while holding everything else constant. I suspect that what we have overlooked is the contribution of the down side — boredom, depression, anxiety, all the 'negative' feelings and emotions — to the overall condition of human psychological well being. But I could be wrong.
You would no doubt reply that Aristotelian happiness embodying as it does a moral judgment about the quality of a person's life, is not a scientific concept. In any case, it does not follow from the fact that no-one would want that kind of deluded happiness, that in such a situation one would not in fact be happy.
It is important that we are talking about happiness and not the sensation of pleasure. In a famous experiment, monkeys' brains were wired so that by pressing a button, they experienced intense pleasure. The result was that the monkeys could not leave the button alone, and died of starvation. Perhaps the same would happen to humans. However, a happiness pill is not a pleasure pill.
What would a happiness pill do? It would fill you with energy and a joy for life. The dullest task would be undertaken with a relish. The pain of failure would be minimized, the joys of success magnified a hundredfold. One would be filled with the love of humanity. One would be incapable of envy or malice. I am not talking about drugging yourself up with Ecstasy tablets and dancing until you drop. The effect would be precisely the effect that is attained by a few fortunate persons through philosophy or religion: a feeling of serene, confident joy.
"How can this be genuine happiness if it is purchased so cheaply?" Well, we could make the tablet really expensive!...Seriously, I can't see that price has anything to do with it, whether measured either in monetary terms, or in terms of human striving and effort.
No, I don't see how one could rule out that there might be such a pill some day. Or, better still, let's suppose one could re-write a few lines of human genetic code to achieve the desired effect. Then there would be no danger of coming down to earth with a thump when the pill supply ran out.
We need not take seriously the skeptics who complain that they prefer to remain unhappy in the face of the world's miseries, because the kind of happiness I am talking about is a spur to action rather than a temptation to complacency. And besides, there wouldn't be any misery. With the happiness pill, or with your genetic code altered, you could be happy, even in the face of imminent starvation.
I just have this suspicion that it wouldn't work. Not necessarily for any reason that can be derived from philosophy, but because of the complex nature of human psychology. Because we do not understand enough about the psychology of happiness, we imagine that you could take one aspect of our mental life and turn it up, the way one might turn up one of the control buttons on an I-Pod, while holding everything else constant. I suspect that what we have overlooked is the contribution of the down side — boredom, depression, anxiety, all the 'negative' feelings and emotions — to the overall condition of human psychological well being. But I could be wrong.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Is Suicide Ethically Wrong?
There are at least two reasons why suicide is regarded as ethically wrong. Firstly, if you commit suicide you fail to take the feelings of others into account; those who care about you. It is the essence of morality to think of others. The second consideration is that you have a moral responsibility to yourself. Immanuel Kant, for instance, argued that we should treat others with respect as Ends in Themselves. As individuals, one among others, we too are an end in itself and should treat ourselves with respect. Kant also thought that our moral community was essentially a rational community and it is rational to want to live.
So if ethics is grounded in either feelings or rationality, suicide is immoral.
However, if it is the case that no-one actually cares whether you commit suicide or not, then on the first reason, I cannot see that it would be unethical. You will not hurt anyone, except yourself: And it is not even clear that you would actually be hurting yourself. Our bodies belong solely to us and I think that we have the right to dispose of them as we think fit.
The rationality argument against suicide shows how you would be hurting yourself and applies even if you don't accept Kant's theory of respect. If you have no reason to live, and no desire to do so, suicide would seem to be the rational conclusion. But this would only be so if there was no future possibility of coming to want to live, and this possibility cannot be rejected. If there is an ethical sense to this it would be that one should be good to oneself and allow oneself the chance of some future happiness.
So if ethics is grounded in either feelings or rationality, suicide is immoral.
However, if it is the case that no-one actually cares whether you commit suicide or not, then on the first reason, I cannot see that it would be unethical. You will not hurt anyone, except yourself: And it is not even clear that you would actually be hurting yourself. Our bodies belong solely to us and I think that we have the right to dispose of them as we think fit.
The rationality argument against suicide shows how you would be hurting yourself and applies even if you don't accept Kant's theory of respect. If you have no reason to live, and no desire to do so, suicide would seem to be the rational conclusion. But this would only be so if there was no future possibility of coming to want to live, and this possibility cannot be rejected. If there is an ethical sense to this it would be that one should be good to oneself and allow oneself the chance of some future happiness.
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